‘I am You’ : Fear and Self-Preservation in Marie de France’s *Le Fresne*

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I.

Written in Anglo-Norman French, *Le Fresne* is one of the twelve Breton *lais* (lays in English) composed by Marie de France and dedicated to Henry II Plantagenet of England in the second half of the twelfth century. This

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1) *Lai* is generally demarcated as a sub-genre of the medieval romance genre. However, the fundamental ethos of *lai* is markedly distinguished from that of the more popular chivalric romance. As for a detailed account on what makes *lai* distinct from chivalric romance, see Glyn S. Burgess and Keith Busby’s introduction to *The Lais of Marie de France*, Penguin Books, 1986 & 1999, pp.26-28.

2) It is still nebulous as to who Marie really was. Against a host of the likely candidates (see Burgess and Busby, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19), we can only say, based on the information gathered from the works supposedly composed by the author, that her name was “Marie” and that she came from France. See the prologue (line 3) to *Guigemar*, the first of the twelve *lais*, and the epilogue to the *Fables*, in which it is stated that: “Marie ai num, si sui de France” [Marie is my name, and I came from France]. All references to *Le Fresne* and other *lais* are from *The Lais of Marie de France*, trans. Robert Hanning and Joan Ferrante, Baker Academic, 1978, and will be presented with line number(s) in parentheses.
short *lai* begins with a young unnamed noble lady in Brittany who accuses the wife of her husband’s friend of having committed adultery. Her accusation, given as soon as the news is announced that the latter had recently given birth to healthy twin sons, is founded on the popular belief that no woman can bear twins unless she had lain with two men. Before long, the wife who made the accusation becomes pregnant herself and gives birth to twin daughters. In a desperate attempt to liberate herself from the dishonor and danger associated with multiple births, she allows her noble maid to stealthily abandon one of the babies at a distant convent. The narratorial focus then shifts toward and remains with the abandoned daughter Fresne, until the denouement where the mother reappears and contributes to restoring the former’s identity.

In this paper, I will focus on the first half of the poem where Fresne’s mother acts as a principal agent of the narrative. More specifically, I would like to concentrate on the particular way in which she attacks the absent lady by associating the latter’s twins birth with adultery, with one leading question in mind: what may cause her to adopt such a violent bearing, who has in other circumstances proven to be nurturing, self-reflective, and compassionate? It is very tempting to define this woman as a selfish, envious noblewoman, for this line of reading seems to be in alliance with the narrator’s initial remarks on her: “she was deceitful and proud, / evil-tongued and envious” (lines 27-28). But I would like to propose another way to read the lady’s bitter slandering of her neighbor. Resorting to the concepts of fear, self-preservation, and projection that T. H. Adorno and Max Horkheimer flesh out in *Dialect of Enlightenment*, I would like to try to account for the impulsive and violent

3) Towards the end of the General Prologue to the *lais*, Marie dedicates her work to a “noble King, / who is so brave and courteous” (lines 43-44). Modern critics mostly agree that the dedicatee must be Henry II who is known to have been acquainted with contemporary poets (Burgess and Busby, op. cit., p.12).
demeanors of the lady in *Le Fresne*. I believe that what Adorno and Horkheimer theorize on fear, self-preservation, and projection is revealing for my principal argument that the lady is no less than a petrified subject who makes desperate exertions to preserve her selfhood, as she confronts dangers evoking the primeval fear that inheres in her psyche and hence she has no control over.

II.

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, self-preservation (*Selbsterhaltung*) is explicated as the ultimate instance that made it possible for the history of man, or civilization, to come into existence. In order to save himself from the terror that the “unsubdued” and “threatening” nature was breeding, the human being in prehistory strived to separate himself from nature and dominate it. Yet he could do so only by making a sacrifice, namely, by abandoning himself. As the excursus on the Homeric Odysseus explicates, the Greek hero, for the purpose of controlling the outside nature, is forced to do violence to his own heart—nature within himself—by literally beating it down. Likewise, man

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4) Of the two English translations of *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, by John Cumming (1979 & 1997) and by Edmund Jephcott (2002), I use Jephcott’s for this paper because his translation is more recent and is closer to the German original. When necessary, though, I will use Cumming’s translation, too.


6) Adorno and Horkheimer present Odysseus as an early example of the subject who forcibly subjects the nature within himself. In order to repress his fury against the licentious maids that visit their suitors at night to gratify sexual desire, Odysseus beats down his breast with his fists and rebukes himself. Adorno and Horkheimer then add their thought: “The subject is not yet articulated to form a firm inner identity. Affects, courage, the ‘heart’ still rise up independently. . . The subject, still split and forced to do violence to nature both within himself and outside, ‘punishes’ his heart, compelling
had to deny nature within himself, such as affects, courage, and the heart, for the sake of dominating first non-human, or extra-human, nature and then other human beings. The moment “human beings cut themselves off from the consciousness of themselves as nature” so as to keep themselves alive, however, they came to witness that all their purposes for self-preservation had become “confused” and “void.” This is because “the substance which is mastered, suppressed, and disintegrated by self-preservation is nothing other than the living entity,” in whose service their separation from and domination over nature is explained. Consequently, it turns out that the self-preservation that intends to master nature ultimately involves self-annihilation, in the sense that it “destroys the very thing which is to be preserved.” It is such a pity that such destructive self-preservation has been “finally automated,” like reflexes, and “the control of internal and external nature has been made the absolute purpose of life.” Despite the impairing impact of self-preservation that will eventually backfire, human beings nonetheless cannot escape this curse or fate because they have “always had to choose between their subjugation to nature and its subjugation to the self.” The choice between these alternatives is the very essence of “enlightenment,” civilization, or subjectification of the self. Civilization is “the triumph of society over

\[\text{it to be patient and denying its direct satisfaction in the present for the sake of a more distant future. Beating one’s breast later became a gesture of triumph: What the victor really expresses is that his victory is over his own nature. The achievement is accomplished by self-preserving reason.} \quad (\text{Ibid., p. 259, n. 5})\]

7) Adorno and Horkheimer, op. cit., p. 42.
8) Ibid., p. 42.
9) Ibid., p. 42.
10) Ibid., p. 43.
12) Ibid., p. 25.
13) Ibid., p. 25.
nature,” but a triumph that returns “everything into mere nature,”[14] because society or system induces the subject to feel insecure and powerless, just as nature had done so.

As the “isolated” schema or pattern of self-preservation, Adorno and Horkheimer discuss “false projection.”[15] While the true or genuine “mimesis” is the subject’s “organic adaptation to otherness,”[16] false projection that Cumming translates as “pathic” or “morbid” projection[17] is “the reverse” of mimesis proper.[18] If “mimesis makes itself resemble its surroundings,” false projection “makes its surroundings resemble itself.”[19] If in mimesis the object becomes the model for the subject to adapt himself to, such that the object becomes intimately known to the subject, the subject in false projection transfers his own volatile and unacknowledged impulses to the object, branding the object as foe.[20] Subjects who are motivated by “blind murderous” impulses have “always seen in the victim the pursuer [persecutor] who has driven them to desperate self-defense.”[21] This sort of “rationalization” in false projection is at once a “ruse” and is compulsory and therefore inescapable.[22] All “perception is projection” to a certain extent, and, as “a legacy of prehistory,” projection has been “automated in man like other forms of offensive or defensive behavior which have become reflexes.”[23] The “compulsively projecting self can project nothing except its own unhappiness”

16) Ibid., p.148.
19) Ibid., p. 154.
20) Ibid., p. 154.
21) Ibid., p. 154.
22) Ibid., p. 154.
23) Ibid., p. 154.
to the object,\textsuperscript{24}) and this “closed circle of perpetual sameness” that the subject in false projection incurs in relation to the object makes him analogous to the paranoiac.\textsuperscript{25}) As with paranoiacs, the ego in false projection “invests the outside world boundlessly with what is within itself,\textsuperscript{26}) and for such ego that is “sinking into the meaningless abyss of itself,” objects are none other than “allegories of [its] ruin, which harbor the meaning of its downfall.”\textsuperscript{27)} Subsequently, the latter becomes an enemy from whom the paranoiac mind has to defend itself. As one automated model of self-preservation, false projection “threatens to dominate everything which goes beyond self-preservation.”\textsuperscript{28)}

III.

In \textit{Le Fresne}, the porter of the convent where the disposed baby was placed discovers her equipped with a gold ring and an embroidered silk robe. The abbess of the convent then raises the infant as her own niece, naming her “Fresne,” after the ash tree wherein she was found (lines 177-229). When Fresne grows up into a beautiful and well-bred maiden, a rich nobleman called Gurun, who has heard of her beauty and noble bearing, falls in love with her and secretly takes her away to his castle. Fresne lives with Gurun for a long time until his vassals force him to marry a noble maiden named Codre who happens to be the twin sister of Fresne (lines 313-48). The mother of Codre, who has no suspicion of the identity of Fresne, comes along with the bride to attend the wedding ceremony. Through the silk brocade that Fresne has spread

\textsuperscript{24}) Adorno and Horkheimer, \textit{op. cit}, p. 158.
\textsuperscript{25}) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{26}) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{27}) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 158.
\textsuperscript{28}) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 161.
on the nuptial bed for Gurun and his bride, the mother recognizes Fresne as her daughter whom she abandoned as an infant (lines 389-452). The mother confesses her long-kept secret to her husband and asks for his mercy (lines 453-59). The marriage of Gurun and Codre is annulled, and Fresne now as a co-heiress is reunited with her sweetheart in a luxurious celebration of matrimony (lines 504-18).

As Robert L. Krueger well notes, unlike many medieval chivalric romances where women are largely “passive objects” of errant knights’ desires or “marginalized temptresses,” the female characters in Marie’s *lais* are depicted as “central figures who exhibit courage and ingenuity.”29) The narratorial concentration of *Le Fresne* is also placed upon women characters – first on the mother and then on the daughter – more often compared to their male counterparts. However, with respect to whose experience is really affirmed of the eponymous Fresne and of her mother, critics seem to diverge in their responses. It is perhaps due to the title of the poem and also due to the narrator’s critical judgment of the mother as malicious and jealous that critics, including Anne Laskaya and Eve Salisbury, fundamentally read the poem as the adventure and growth of the daughter, identifying her mother as the principal antagonist.30) They include *Le Fresne* in the long list of conventional medieval narratives that “condemn women’s speech and laud women’s silence.”31) Nonetheless, as Elizabeth Archibald points out, *Le Fresne* is the


30) Laskaya and Salisbury’s assessment of the mother of Freine in the Middle English *Lay le Freine* can also be applied to the mother of Fresne in *Le Fresne*, in that they take the English redaction as “a relatively close translation” of Marie’s original and attempt to restore the parts missing in the English poem based on Marie’s poem. See their introduction to *Lay le Freine, The Middle English Breton Lays*, ed. Anne Laskaya and Eve Salisbury, Western Michigan University, 1995, p. 62.
mother’s story “as well as” Fresne’s, in the sense that the mother plays the crucial roles at the beginning and end of the poem. In other words, it is the mother who initiates the conflict by slandering her neighbor. She is also the one who brings the story to reconciliation by acknowledging her past wrongdoings and subsequently by contributing to restoring Fresne from a groundless foundling back to a legitimate daughter of a noble lord. It is also subject to further discussion whether Marie in this particular lai indeed endorses conventional teachings on femininity, while she persistently refuses to reproduce or reinforce medieval stereotypes and norms in her other lais.

In order to comprehend the implication and to measure the impact of the lady’s attack on her neighbor by stating that “[no] woman could have two sons in one birth—unless two men had lain with her” (lines 40-42), one does not have to turn elsewhere because the text itself offers a plausible answer. It is said that the husband of the accused noblewoman “hated his worthy wife because of it [the accusation], strongly suspected her, and kept her under strict guard” (lines 59-63). Despite the fact that she is innocent (line 64), and even though not everyone accepts the accusation as a reality, such as the husband of the slanderer (lines 45-48, lines 55-56), the victim’s honor and status as wife and lady has still been greatly jeopardized. Consequently, her safety and welfare can no longer be guaranteed inside the family and perhaps also in

31) Ibid., p. 63.
33) For example, as critics of Marie’s lais have repeatedly emphasized, the so-called mal mariée lais, such as Guigemar, Yonec, Chevrefoil, and Laüstic, feature the extra-marital love in which an unhappily married young lady and a bachelor knight fall in love with each other. Marie in none of these poems disapproves their love simply because it is extra-marital. Instead, as in Guigemar, Marie seems to affirm adulterous love, as long as it is “loyal and deep,” as Burgess and Busby point out (op. cit., 28-31).
society. In this respect, the calumny is no less than a potential homicidal attack to the victim.

With the violent nature of the accusation unveiled, one must then question whether, as some critics have claimed and as the narrator at least on the surface level seems to encourage so, it is indeed the lady’s selfish disposition and blind envy that propels her to throw such a lethal attack against the wife of her husband’s friend. I would like to contend that what drives her into the apparently anti-social outburst is the primeval impulse to preserve herself facing the danger that threatens to destroy her, of which the force is so compulsory that it goes beyond her control and is therefore incommensurable with regular jealousy. Until the very moment when the messenger of the neighbor appears and announces to the whole household of the neighbor’s successful delivery of twin sons, the lady has proved herself to be a nurturing person. Her affectionate upbringing of a girl from another noble family (lines 99-102), before her own children are born, bears witness to her caring nature. What is more, she reveals herself as a reflecting and compassionate person in other moments. Not only does she regretfully admit the backfiring of her slanderous remarks on herself (lines 85-89) during the long monologue spoken after giving birth to twins, she also grows fond of and sympathetic to the good Fresne, who will be banished from Gurun’s household because of her own daughter (lines 385-88). Accordingly, it is too superficial to say that the lady is an example of a selfish and envious noblewoman. As Michelle Freeman rightly observes, she is “hardly an unregenerate stock villainess; she is devoid neither of charitable impulses nor even of feelings akin to maternal love.”

Similarly, the narrator’s opening statement on the lady that “she was deceitful...

and proud, evil-tongued and envious” is to be taken not as any real judgment on her evil nature but as a question obliquely posed to us readers about what may make a conscious, sensible, and nurturing woman into a frightening persecutor of an innocent neighbor.

Given in Adorno and Horkheimer’s false projection, the mother of the twin sons compels the lady to put on desperate self-defense. To the mind of the latter, namely, the victim is herself and subsequently the former becomes the persecutor. When the poem opens, it is impossible to tell one lady from the other, in that they are both unnamed, and their husbands whose names are also unknown are equally rich, brave, and worthy knights (lines 5-8). The fact that they are wives of certain noblemen seems sufficient to define who they are. However, they soon begin to be distinguished from each other when one of them becomes pregnant, while the other still remains childless. The pregnant lady is fated to be branded as a foe to the other lady the moment the birth of her twin sons is announced in public. As Freeman insightfully elaborates, with the neighbor’s bearing of not just one but two sons, the barrenness, or childless state, of the lady is thus reinforced.35) The new father’s suggestions that one of the boys be sent to the lady’s household, named after the lord, and raised by the childless couple (lines 17-18) in particular would have terrified the lady because it would mean that she will be compelled to acknowledge the failure of her conjugal mission to reproduce a proper heir who will continue the name and heritage of the husband. The arrival of one of the boys to her household can bring her to downfall, insofar as the close presence of the boy may work as a constant reminder of her infertility. She may also be neglected by her husband, supplanted by another fruitful woman, and eventually excluded from the household and society.

35) Ibid., pp. 250-51.
Given these circumstances, it is an unfortunate yet unavoidable fate in certain respects that the new mother and her twin sons are perceived by the childless lady as what Adorno and Horkheimer term “danger signs.” Danger signs are motifs that allude to the ultimate origin where the subject feels naked and helpless in face of formidable nature and subsequently trigger the “horror of the primeval age” that the subject underwent in biological prehistory.\textsuperscript{36}) Adorno and Horkheimer refer to what the subject feels towards danger signs as “idiosyncrasy” or “idiosyncratic aversion.”\textsuperscript{37}) When the subject experiences idiosyncrasy towards a certain object, he is “not quite master” of himself because his bodily reactions, such as the hair standing on end and the heart stopping beating, escape his control and obey “autonomously” the “fundamental biological stimuli.”\textsuperscript{38}) Human beings at first coped with the fearful danger signs in nature and the concomitant horror by physically imitating numbness or death of nature. Adorno and Horkheimer regard those adaptations as the “archaic patterns of self-preservation.”\textsuperscript{39}) However, bodily mimesis of nature as a way of self-defense gave its way to a controlled and “identitarian” thinking that in essence subsumes the difference of the object under the sameness of the ego.\textsuperscript{40}) This is how the human being did violence to nature in return for the violence that nature had first wielded upon him. The real tragedy, however, is that the self’s domination of nature with the identifying rationality as self-preservation results, first, in destroying nature within himself, as seen in the case of Odysseus, and then in committing violence against fellow human beings by projecting his own unacknowledged impulses onto others, thereby making them wretched as well. It is a sort of curse or original sin that, despite

\textsuperscript{36}) Adorno and Horkheimer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{37}) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{38}) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{39}) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{40}) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 148.
its defective function, this mechanism of self-preservation has perpetuated itself like reflexes in the psyche of man since the beginning of human history. Adorno and Horkheimer theorize that the mechanism will not let go of the self until one regains one’s primeval mimetic ability to adapt to the object outside of oneself,\(^{41}\) the self-reflective and negating ability of thought, which the two theorists believe can counteract the paranoid movement of self-preservation.\(^{42}\)

The accusing lady in *Le Fresne* does not seem to be the master of herself, either, in the scene where the news of the birth of the twin boys is publicized and the new father’s suggestions are announced. The scene overflows with high anxiety, discomfort, and disgrace, where the lady of the household laughs loudly (line 25), raises her voice for all the people present to hear (line 30), questions the fidelity of the new mother by associating the birth of her twins to her promiscuity, and, as a consequence, embarrasses and humiliates the messenger, her husband, and finally the new parents (lines 43-44). It appears that she completely forgets the decorum expected of her as the lady of a noble household when the official, communal dinner is being celebrated with the lord presiding at the high table (lines 21-26), understandably with a multitude of companions present on other tables. It seems that her normal reflective faculty has been disabled and overpowered by the horror that the new mother, her sons, and all the fearful possibilities trigger. The idiosyncratic aversion that she undergoes has nothing to do with the objects’ intentions, but it is an involuntary reaction of her entire being.

The lady’s attacking of the neighbor as an adulterous wife and her babies as bastards by extension can be read as the former’s desperate attempts to preserve herself from the menace that she believes the objects are posing to her. Because she is unable to resemble the object, that is to say, because she

\(^{41}\) Adorno and Horkheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

cannot bear herself a child as with the other lady, she makes the other resemble her instead, by projecting her own insecurity, powerlessness, and fear to the other. With this “identitarian” reasoning, so to speak, the lady as the subject induces the object to the same level of insecurity and powerlessness that the former has experienced. The object gets identified with the subject in the latter’s psyche. Let us not forget all the hatred, suspicion, and confinement that the mother of the twin boys has had to bear simply on the grounds of the allegation of adultery. By now, it is no longer important that the subject is barren, while the object is fertile, because their differences are diluted by the fear that they share. In other words, their positions in the household and society are equally uncertain, precarious, and potentially able to be displaced by other women. The slandering woman may have thought that she could get rid of the object, the source of her fear, by liquidating the object’s peculiars and subsequently identifying the object with her. However, she was as yet not fully aware of the universality or ubiquity of the object.

Once crippled by fear, the lady’s capacity for self-reflection does not recuperate itself until, with the birth of her own twin daughters, she finds herself in the same position that her neighbor was once in. It is as if the fortuity of having twins jerked her mind back from the state of numbness in which it had been confined since the crisis at the supper scene:

Indeed, I condemned myself
When I slandered all womankind.
Didn’t I say it never happened—
At least, we’ve never seen it happen—
That a woman could have twins
Unless she had lain with two men?
Now that I have twins, it seems to me
my words have come back to haunt me.

Whoever slanders another
never knows when it will rebound on him. (lines 79-88)

She sighs to herself and acknowledges that it is she who cursed women’s fecundity by branding it as a sign of promiscuity. She also admits that she did not know that denying fertile women, whom her neighbor apparently represented, was also an act of denying herself. Doing violence to the object, in other words, was actually doing violence to her self.

The lady’s bearing of twin daughters could work as a grace or the second chance that would shift her thought about her relation to the object and help her form a new, mimetic relation with the object. So far, because their birth evoked the idiosyncratic aversion by reminding the subject of the ultimate origin in nature, the twins of the other woman have meant the otherness, or what Adorno and Horkheimer call the “non-identical,” to which the subject was unable to adapt herself and therefore has had to annihilate for preserving herself. However, the unexpected and undeniable revelation that the new twins are her own, that they are not from outside but from inside of her, could lead her to the enlightenment that the object, or nature, exists not only outside but also within her. Such recognition of the existence of the non-identical inside of her could counteract and break the morbid pattern of self-preservation that has compulsively seized and operated her being. This is probably what Marie may have truly wanted to point to with the installation of the theme of the rebounding luck in the quotation. With this theme, Marie is not merely relaying any didactic ideology, such as that one should behave well, or one will be punished. Instead, the author seems to be much more radical in terms of exploring how the compulsive mechanism of self-preservation and fear operate within the psyche of the subject. It is very unfortunate but hardly
unanticipated that the lady does not reach this level of enlightenment. Instead, she relapses into her chronic pattern of self-preservation, by perceiving her own twins as the object or foe and attempting to annihilate one of them. She may believe that, in doing so, she could secure her own safety. By disposing of one twin, however, she merely delays the due return of the object until more than one decade, in the form of the grown-up Fresne.

IV.

According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the mechanism of self-preservation is automated when the subject confronts what they refer to as the danger sign that triggers the horror of the primeval age that the subject in prehistory used to feel in face of the formidable and threatening nature. As a schema of self-preservation, Adorno and Horkheimer postulate, projection is automated in the subject like reflexes. The compulsively projecting self, who is not quite master of himself because his bodily reactions escape his control and obey autonomously the fundamental biological stimuli, can project nothing but his own unhappiness to the object. I have argued that the lady in Le Fresne is a fearful subject whose self-preservation system is automated against the danger signs, which are embodied in the neighbor noblewoman and her twin sons and then the former’s own twin daughters, for they all evoke the primeval fear over which the subject has no control. Perhaps, the author Marie wished to elaborate how the compulsive mechanism of self-preservation and fear dominate the psyche of the subject.

[Key words] Marie de France, Le Fresne, Dialect of Enlightenment, fear, self-preservation
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[Résumé]

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*Le Fresne* is one of the twelve Breton *lais* that an Anglo-Norman author Marie de France is claimed to have composed in the second half of the twelfth century. This poem begins with an unnamed young noble lady who accuses the wife of her husband’s friend of having committed adultery as soon as the news is broken that the latter has just given birth to healthy twin sons. In this paper, I will concentrate on the implication of this major crisis of the romance. Neither the narrator’s initial identification of the lady as a deceitful and envious woman nor modern critics’ readings of her that are in essence reinforcing the narrator’s judgment seem to fully explain what may drive her to throw such a lethal attack on the innocent woman. This is because she has presented herself as a nurturing, self-reflective, and sympathetic individual in other occasions. I will try to account for the impulsive and violent demeanors of the lady by relying on the concepts revolving around fear, self-preservation, and projection that T. H. Adorno and Max Horkheimer elaborate in *Dialect of Enlightenment*. I will argue that the lady is none less than a fearful subject whose self-preservation system is automated against the danger signs, which are embodied in the new mother and her twin sons and then the lady’s own twin daughters, all of which evoke the primeval fear over which she has no control.
Key words] Marie de France, Le Fresne, Dialect of Enlightenment, fear, self-preservation

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