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TIME: July 2
Abstract:
We study a model of strategic interaction between a terrorist organization and a security agency in a transportation network carrying passengers and freight between locations. By carrying bads to a target location through the transportation network, the terrorist organization can damage the target and disrupt the operation of the network. While gaining utility from the damage of the target and from the disruption of the network, the terrorist organization incurs the cost of carrying bads. A security agency is informed of the terrorist attack. By shutting down some transportation routes in the network, the security agency can protect the target from the attack. Since the shutdown of routes disrupts the operation of the network, the security agency incurs the cost of shutting down transportation routes. The security agency also loses utility from the damage of the target. In this model we find an optimal security policy under which the security agency can protect the target from devastating terrorism and effectively operate the network. To understand how the terrorist organization commits terrorism under the optimal security policy, we find a class of subgame perfect equilibria of this model. We also introduce algorithms to find a maximum flow and a minimum cut in a transportation network.
WCU Local Director: Jinwoo Kim (Yonsei University)
BK Director: Jihong Lee (Yonsei University)
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