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TIME: July 13, 14
7/13 (3:00~6:00 p.m.), 7/14 (3:00~5:00 p.m.)
Lecture notes (slides) are available at
http://sites.google.com/site/fuhitokojimaeconomics/Fuhito-Kojima/mini-lectures
Below is the overview of the lecture:
How to match people to other people or goods is an important problem in society. Just think of some examples such as (1) student placement in schools, (2) labor markets where workers and firms are matched, and (3) organ donation, in which patients are matched to potential donors. The economics of matching and market design has analyzed these problems and improved real-life institutions in recent years. For example, economists have helped (1) NYC and Boston design their school choice programs, (2) medical communities reorganize their hiring procedure, and (3) organize systematic kidney exchange mechanisms to give kidneys to as many patients as possible.
This course introduces the theory of matching and market design, and discusses how the theory can be applied to these (and other) applications. I will put emphasis on recent advances in the topic and present open questions so that interested students can promptly come to the frontier and begin their own research.
The basic textbook is Tow-Sided Matching by Roth and Sotomayor (1990) from Oxford University Press, but I will also cover recent journal articles and working papers.
WCU Director: Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)
WCU Local Director: Jinwoo Kim (Yonsei University)
BK Director: Jihong Lee (Yonsei University)
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