Asymmetric Information about Rivals' Types in Standard Auctions (with Yeon-Koo Che), Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46, 383-397.


Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation (with Yeon-Koo Che), Econometrica, 2006, 74, 1063-1107.


Asymmetric Information about Rivals' Types in Standard Auctions: An Exepriment (with James Andreoni and Yeon-Koo Che), Games and Economic Behavior, 2007,  59, 240-259.  

   *subjects' instructions: first-price auction, second-price auction


Correlation on Belief and Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games,  Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, 2007, 18, 52-61.


The Value of  an Informed Bidder in Common Value AuctionsJournal of Economic Theory, 2008, 143, 585-595.


Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions (with Yeon-Koo Che), Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, 565-603.

Bidding with Securities: Comments (with Yeon-Koo Che), American Economic Review, forthcoming.

Do Breakup Fees Lead to Efficient Takeover? (with Yeon-Koo Che and Tracy Lewis), Economics Letters, forthcoming.  


Working Papers and Works in Progress

Screening Loss Averse Consumers (with Jong-Hee Hahn, Sang-Hyun Kim, and Jihong Lee).

Weak Cartels and Optimal Auctions (with Yeon-Koo Che and Danielle Condorelli).

Strong Collusion-Proof Implementation (with Yeon-Koo Che), Coming soon.

Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Bidders.