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# Space, Place, Maps:

## Reflections on Identity

### ABSTRACT

**P**lace and identity are intricately related to each other, in that human subjects are tied to one or another state, even in their overseas travels, and despite the diminished role states play in this era of super-state globalization. In contrast to the waning power of “my country,” the cities, particularly the metropolises of the world, have become the nodal points in a world conceived as a network of cities, in relationship to which the subject seeks to articulate his or her self-determination. Emma Bovary’s imaginary indulgence in her vision of Paris aided by a mere map of the city is a classical image in this regard, but it replicates itself with variations in other cultural experiences, such as the would-be tourist looking at his guidebook or the TV viewer seeing the city’s image in the media. On the political side, the representation of places in words and maps in the colonial context further exemplifies the intimate and often devastating connection between place and identity, as the case of Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign and, closer to us, the drawing of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel remind us.

1.

Many of us, frequently or at least twice (in a return flight) fly across the borders of nation states, whether for business or for pleasure. Outside the small windows is all white and blue, with no indication of where we are as far as the naked eye can detect. Inside, however, there is the screen, which when not busy entertaining (or torturing) us with second-rate Hollywood movies shows us where we are on the map, the tiny symbol of the airplane tied to a linear mark that fitfully moves on to our destination. Whatever may be the thoughts, fancies, woes that pass through the waking or half-asleep minds of the passengers, they are bound to be punctuated by recognitions of where we are on the map. The farther away from our city of departure the more relieved or worried we may be; the closer we are to our destination, the more eager or relaxed we would be. Yet in itself, the airline travel denotes a certain version of freedom. Up in the sky we exist in that time or space in between two gates of national borders, which may entail at least a momentary freedom from national identities. We are classified, of course, according to the amount of money we can spend on our tickets: the majority of passengers travel on “economy” seats, or on the cheap flights heralded in by Easyjet with unnumbered (and often dirty) seats and with no free drinks. However cramped the seats may be, air travel provides us with the opportunity to enjoy an illusion of freedom from, among other things, our permanent addresses, bills, taxes, and debts.


Nothing is permanent, however: humans being terrestrial creatures, we cannot lead a permanent aerial existence. Land we must on some state and produce our documents issued by our governments to the powers controlling the airport gate. After 9.11, not merely our faces, but our body, down to the skeletons, have to be examined and checked before we can be released into the space outside the airport. Risking the danger of excessive generalization, one may say that all mortals living on earth are owned by some state. According to one old fiction of Enlightenment, individuals are sovereign subjects entitled to claim rights to freedom and property. Yet the democratic states nonetheless constantly make claims on us the citizens through taxation, conscription, identification. The passengers carried far above on airplanes are controlled, registered, known not just by one state but two, for passports stamped with entry visa entail a collaboration of two governments. In the memorable phrase of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, the state is belongs to the “apparatuses of capture” (Deleuze and Guattari 435) in the sense that it amounts to one vast

taxing machinery that may release us temporarily on parole but never permanently. The state that captures us does so by a mechanism of knowledge. An individual as a known subject bearing an identity card or passport finds himself in the objectified position as an item in the registry of the state computer to be used as the state sees fit. We inhabit spaces which are all, one way or another, spaces occupied by state machinery or capital or both.

Flying from and above one space to another, then, does little to liberate us from our bondage to space, which is always-already a space of power. One can fly away from one's state, yet no safe flight dispatches us straight to eternity. One lands, and one lands always on some particular state. Yet we mortals dream of flying away all the same. "Life is a hospital where every patient is obsessed by the desire of changing bed," wrote Charles Baudelaire. The world of airline travel is one huge hospital where every passenger is obsessed by the desire to change his or her place within the ward. "One would like to suffer opposite the stove, another is sure he would get well beside the window" ("Anywhere Out of the World," Baudelaire 99). Deleuze and Guattari describe this desire to change beds as the tendency towards "deterritorialization" or a loosening of territorial bonds on individuals. Yet deterritorialization provides no genuine outlet to one's desire to rid oneself of all shackles. The city, historically, has always been the site of such move away from territorial ties, so that the big cities serve as "circuit-points" of a network formed across state boundaries. Indeed, one flies from one city to another, to international airports linked to the metropolises of the world. As a "threshold of deterritorialization," the city stands against the state's attempt to yoke it to the back country (Deleuze-Guattari 432), for which reason, no doubt, the two words "country" and the "state" have become synonymous. The word "country" rings in one's ear with a more comprehensive connotation than "state," as Raymond Williams points out (Williams 81), but the historic bond between them does point to the state's stronger kinship ties to the countryside than to the cities. Yet the sovereign state is increasingly behaving like big cities, as it is engulfed by a global, super-state network, which transforms it into a "megapolis" within a worldwide network of states (Deleuze and Guattari 434-45). The states at the present time are being transformed into member states of one or more international organization, of which the European Union ranks as the most salient specimen. As I write this essay, preparation for "G 20" summit is on its final stage in Seoul—the nation, as the government propaganda drills the point in again and again, has not only joined the rich men's club of the world but has grown important enough to host it. History is being made at

this moment, apparently. “The Seoul summit is by itself important in that it is the first to be held by an emerging (and non-Anglo Saxon in that sense) country,” writes a columnist for *Korea Times* (“Seoul Summit To Determine Future”), eager to persuade lukewarm bystanders not impressed by the great event. One may change states if one wishes, from an emerging to a fully emerged state, from a non-Anglo to Anglo states, but then states matter increasingly less, as the planet is controlled by and from the powerful metropolises of the world—New York, London, Shanghai, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, and (as some may wish to add) Seoul:

Figure 1: Metropolises and the Depopulated World Atlas



(source: <http://cfit.independent.gov.uk/pubs/5annual/images/01.gif>)

The map that highlights these major cities of the world in the above figure (minus Seoul, pace *Korea Times*) transcends the lands and territories between them, forming a vacant, empty, depopulated world atlas that represents little else than the absolute predominance of the big cities over their respective countries.

The state also has its own problems, then. Its hold on the citizen-subjects is being strenuously pulled apart by a stronger force above it. Although some states are more independent and powerful than other states, no single state is exempt from this inter-state chain that checks the sovereignty of states and curbs its right, for instance, to print money and measure the value of things with its own currency. The emergence of euro, the currency used by most member states of the EU, launched a new era in the history of the nation-state.

The old global currency, however, is alive and kicking, rather viciously, one may add. The so-called “G2,” US and China, at this moment are waging a “currency war,” which affects the “G20” and virtually the entire world. China has announced to raise its interest rate, to defend itself from the charges of artificially depressing its currency rate (higher interest rate will draw back liquidity from the market, to make Chinese money relatively scarce, i.e. more expensive). This has global repercussions from Europe to India, or more precisely, in the major financial markets stationed in the metropolises of the world, as a recent article from *The Guardian* reports:

“The pound reacted by falling more than two cents against the dollar in mid-afternoon trading, while the euro was 1% lower on the day at \$1.3805.”

“Stock markets reacted badly to the news with Germany’s Dax down 41.10 points, or 0.6%, at 6475.53, while the CAC-40 in France was 20.99 points, or 0.6%, lower at 3813.51. The FTSE-100 index of leading British shares was down at 5,711, a drop of more than 30 points.”

“In the US, the Dow Jones industrial average was down 146.18 points at 10,997.51.”

“Hitendra Dave, head of global markets at HSBC India, said internal pressures led to the rise....”

“Chris Turner, head of foreign exchange at the Dutch bank ING, said: “This is part of the moderate tightening cycle that we are seeing from Chinese authorities to balance their economy. It is part of the normalisation of interest rates in an economy which is growing at a modestly fast clip.”

“The market is reacting like there is an increased risk of hard landing with the commodity currencies like the Aussie being sold off, but I don’t think that is the case,” he said.” (“China’s Interest Rate Rise”)

In this typical economic grammar to which the writer subscribes, the subject of (re)action is neither the human agents nor the governments, but either the currency itself or the “market” or its numerical index (“the pound reacted”, “stock markets reacted,” “Dow Jones industrial average was down,” “the market is reacting” etc.). In this megapolis of markets linked to each other inexorably, the states have little leverage, even for an exceptionally centralized single-party state such as China. Gone are the good old days when a state could print its money with impunity whenever it desired.

2.

Given all the pressures working against the sovereignty of states, one may feel inclined to look upon one's state with a more sympathetic, if not an outright patriotic sentiment—and for some very practical reasons, too, if you are travelling abroad spending money you have earned at your “home” country. You feel closer to your state, even or particularly when you are away from it, as long as your cash comes to you from the country where you pay your taxes, rents, interests, and bribes. The nation-state has become unfashionable for some time already in the world of ideas; in the real world of business it has become a transparent stopover station of the wandering global finance. Yet the state does survive for the individual, as a tourist or traveler, if nothing else. The history of modernity and modern subjectivity links itself organically to a process of identification of the subject with the nation state. The “nation=state=people” equation, in Eric Hobsbawm's handy formulation, emerged during the Age of Revolution (i.e. the French and American Revolutions) (Hobsbawm 18-19). Before then, the state appeared to the subjects as an alien force, or literally a mere taxing force (both in France's *ancien régime* and colonial America). With the popular revolutions the state put up a new name, basing its legitimacy on the equivalence of “we, the people.” The “people,” as the collective form of the individual subject, brought together the previously alien state and the previously alienated subjects of the state. The “nation” is the name of this equation, embodied, for instance, in the national currency you are paid by, or in the case of euro, the “national” signatures of the member states printed on it.

Of course, the “nation” vigorously activates other devices of equation (national history, linguistic identity, ethnic homogeneity, or national football teams) to identify itself with both the people and the state. A single homogeneous nation defines itself according to a single, continuous history. Yet history often is too factual, showing how the nation in question has a far more complex, hybrid, dubious past. For this reason, history borrows from legend and myth, or what Anthony Smith calls the “the ‘myth-symbol’ complex” (Smith 15) that represents the nation's identity in a set of static images (of the venerable faces stamped on your currency note, for instance) or stories (of the great ancestors or current sports stars). Babel lends a helping hand, moreover: language at once divides and links peoples. France, for instance, is a single nation because the “people” speak French. Yet Hobsbawm reminds us how 50% of those subjects of the French state in 1789 did not speak the language of Parisians (Hobsbawm 60). The Chinese are those who speak Chinese, or are they? In

addition to the highly divergent regional accents of Mandarin, the Chinese subjects in Hong Kong speak Cantonese which sounds almost like meaningless and silly foreign language in the ears of Beijing residents. Even the language of Koreans, supposed to have been a “single-ethnic nation” for ages, never succeeded in fully integrating the tribes. Apart from the North/South division for over a half century leading to different phonetics, morphology, and grammar, the major political parties in South Korea each cater to constituencies divided according to regional accents: the ruling conservative party speaks with unabashed Kyōngsang regional accent, while the centrist opposition grumbles in a subdued Chōlla accent. Moreover, generational gap asserts itself linguistically in contemporary South Korean society. The younger South Koreans brought up on their internet-speak and mobile texting have all but destroyed Korean grammar, as the established organs of public opinion frequently complain. “Mangling of language is a phenomenon rapidly spreading through the internet and on-line computer games. The lingo formed in these media are often used in the real world, too. We even hear them occasionally in the public broadcasting channels,” laments *JoongAngIlbo* (“Mangling of Hangeul by the Internet”). The fatherland or the mother tongue surely has limits as anchors of identity, particularly in this hyperactive age of hypermedia.

The city, in contrast, prospers, particularly if it is a metropolis which absorbs the manpower of countries and nations. The big city, moreover, never ceases to “present” itself to the subjects, in maps, pictures, films, news. Consider how New York (Manhattan, mostly) is constantly exhibited in the American media, both in its chic version such as *Sex and the City* and in its scary versions offered by the endlessly concocted disaster films. In South Korea, too, Seoul, the nation’s New York, is perennially visible. The background of MBC Newsdesk (news at nine) in the evening, for example, displays the neon-spotted, traffic-jammed freeways on the banks of Han river flowing through the capital:

Figure 2: Seoul Traffic Gracing National News



(source: <http://www.bcpark.net/imagedb/orig/2009>)

Even if you do not (or rather, cannot) live in Seoul, you are not exempt from the sight of the capital city every evening, with the added misery of being reminded of how where you are living is not Seoul, how it has to be defined as lack, deprivation, fault in its comparison with the big city ever visible on the television screen, which, furthermore, speaks in the prim, lucid, chilly accent of the metropolis. In a different country in a different century, we see a classic articulation of the provincial subject's tormented desire at once intimidated by and attracted to the metropolis. The case is that of the unfortunate young housewife in Gustave Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*. The titular heroine in her monotonous provincial house in Normandy indulges in studying the details of a map showing the "area" of her chosen dreams, Paris. Emma Bovary has just earned her place as the wife of the country doctor Charles through her good looks. Yet the pleasure of marriage, if there were any, quickly evaporates as the husband snores away his evenings after gorging his throat with food, exhausted by a hard day's work. The only consolation for the idealistic and Romantic spouse is the books and other fragile vessels available for her imaginary transcendence of her banal reality, such as a map of Paris:

She bought for herself a street-map of Paris and with her fingertip went on expeditions in the capital. She walked along the boulevards, stopping at every corner, between the lines representing the streets, in front of the white squares that marked the houses. At length, her eyes grew tired, she would close them and see, in the darkness, the gas-lamps flickering in the wind as the folding steps of carriages that were let down with a great clatter at the theatre entrances.

.....

Paris, vaster than the ocean, shimmered before Emma's eyes in a rosy haze. But its teeming, tumultuous life was divided into compartments, classified into separate tableaux. (Flaubert 52-53)

The picture of the space designated as Paris that emerges in Emma's prodigious imagination is full of luxurious gaiety and refined fashion. Certainly, it amounts to only a hazy map filled with vague images of luxuriant opulence as the "gas-lamps flickering in the wind" suggest. Yet it sufficiently serves her purpose of defining herself as a subject deprived of the glamour of Paris but actively craving it at the same time. The aerial view of nocturnal Seoul traffic, ever stirring like rippling seas, may have similar effect on those watching the national news away from the city: the nightlife the image hints at gives the viewer a sense of either regret (at not being "a part of it") or relief (at being free from its "sins").


Emma deserves further analysis, given the inevitable political implications attached to her yearning. This representation of an imaginary Paris colored and flavored by Emma's ardent subjective fancy vigilantly excludes alternative versions of the place such as the crime narratives offered by the popular contemporary fictions such as *Les mystères de Paris* by Eugène Sue. On the other hand, it would share a great deal with the tourist versions of Paris catering to the visitors to the capital past and present, for Emma's street map of Paris is meant to be a guide to visitors primarily. Her imagination gives the map eloquence, classificatory systems, organized knowledge ("divided into compartments, classified into separate tableaux") that control the inchoate forms of the city's roaring life. Paris, according to the introductory text appended to a colored tourist map in *DK Eyewitness Travel Guides: Europe*, for example, is a

city of over two million people, and has been the economic, political, and artistic hub of France since Roman times. During the medieval and Renaissance periods, Paris dominated northern Europe as a religious and cultural center. The city was rejuvenated in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, when its slums were replaced with the elegant avenues and boulevards that make modern Paris a delight to stroll around. Today the city strives to be at the heart of a unified Europe. Chic cafés, gourmet restaurants, and fashionable shopping are the major attractions for many visitors. (150)

Political references abound in this brief summary of the capital, not all of which are correct (Paris was far less important than Southern France in Roman times), and all of which come with a supreme disregard of the brutal human costs paid to yield its "elegant" appearance

(such as the revolutions of the nineteenth century and Haussmann's ruthless destruction of the city's working-class districts). Of course, neither the famous young madam's map nor the tourist guide book is obliged to meet the requirements of objective historiography, for which reason precisely, both indicate how representations of a capital city are intimately related to a restricted determination of identity: that of an aspiring dreamer in Flaubert, that of an indifferent visitor seeking "attractions" in the travel guide book.

Figure 3: Tourist Map of Paris in *DK Eyewitness Travel Guides: Europe*



Representation of place, in both examples, appears to be penetrated through and through with the desire to be released from the very different conditions of the particular place to which Emma is tied by her marriage, and from the quotidian routine to which the would-be traveler is tied. At stake for Emma is the very possibility of envisioning a different place, even with the supplement of the least colorful medium of a map. As Flaubert eloquently shows, this vital aid to imaginary travel to the chosen place of her desire liberates her from her immediate surroundings and even from the dull medium that led her to such musings. With her eyes closed she can see, through what can be called the pure medium of her desire, Paris as she would like to have it, which in turn produces an alternative map, with its distinct parts and

districts that exclude the dirtier, less comely streets of Paris, as does the guidebook map above cutting out central Paris from the metropolitan sprawl and its drab, deprived, defeated *banlieus*.

The latter example above drawn from a most humble realm of travel guidebook activates an imaginary grammar that has a more respectable ancestry. Paris celebrated as “a religious and cultural center” in the past and the “the heart of a unified Europe” at present echoes the trope of France occupying a strategic position at the center of Europe, asserted, for instance, in François Guizot's *The History of Civilization in Europe*:

We of France occupy a favourable position for pursuing the study of European civilization. Flattery of individuals, even of our country, should be at all times avoided: it is without vanity, I think, we may say that France has been the centre, the focus of European civilization. I do not pretend, it were monstrous to do so, that she has always, and in every direction, marched at the head of nations. At different epochs, Italy has taken the lead of her, in the arts; England, in political institutions; and there may be other respects under which, at particular periods, other European nations have manifested a superiority to her; but it is impossible to deny, that whenever France has seen herself thus outstripped in the career of civilization, she has called up fresh vigour, has sprung forward with a new impulse, and has soon found herself abreast with, or in advance of, all the rest. And not only has this been the peculiar fortune of France, but we have seen that when the civilizing ideas and institutions which have taken their rise in other lands, have for the common benefit of European civilization, they have been necessitated to undergo, to a certain extent, a new preparation in France; and it has been from France, as from a second native country, that they have gone forth to the conquest of Europe. (Guizot 11)

To be fair to the author, Guizot is no mere mouthpiece of jingoism and his claims do not sound like empty bombast, for France, indeed, is a most civilized country indeed. Yet a closer scrutiny reveals a particular pattern of Guizot's desire or anxiety to prevail over other possible centers of European civilization such as Italy and England. The particular nature of France's greatness, as he clearly underlines, is a tenacious competitive spirit. France will never fail to catch up whenever she “has seen herself . . . outstripped.” France will never miss opportunities to prescribe French taste to those “civilizing ideas and institutions” with foreign provenance. Guizot's France is the agent of a subjective projection, as ardent as Emma Bovary's yearning to transcend her provincial world.

3.

The question of projection seems something that ever haunts any positioning of a subject vis-à-vis a particular place. Can there be no objective, impartial, neutral view of places, then? The possibility of knowing and studying an area, region, city, or nation with transparent scientific passion free from mercenary interests and subjective bias is something social scientists may assume for professional reasons. Research by social scientists may surely be motivated by a pure passion for science, by knowledge for its own sacred sake. But there is always the possibility of a Mephistopheles seducing Faust to convert his learning into more tangible rewards in exchange for that pure scientific “soul.” Those French scholars whose fervent desire it was to know the Orient (i.e. the Arabic world) were not greatly inclined to refuse the seductive offers of one particularly pertinacious Mephistopheles called Napoleon. The story is excellently told by Edward Said’s *Orientalism*. Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition marked a turning point in the tradition of studying, whether physically or metaphysically, the place the West called the Orient, in that the “scientific” work on the region not only prepared the conqueror in advance but later served as practical administrative supplement and manual for maintaining French power over the region. Napoleon knew the Orient even before going to Egypt, and that very knowledge, thanks to the hardworking Orientalists, helped him, when he landed on the sandy terrain of Egypt, to construct in practice an Orient as he knew from his Orientalist authorities. In particular, Comte de Volney’s two books, *Voyage en Égypte et en Syrie* and the *Considérations sur la guerre actuel de Turc*, served as helpful guidebooks that kept Napoleon “from being disoriented by the Orient” (Said 81). Moreover, there were experts translating Arabic into French, trained in the government-funded foreign language school, the “École Publique des Langues Orientales” established in 1793 to teach Arabic, Turkish, and Persian (Said 83). Those young men who had gone through the ordeal of learning these forbiddingly difficult languages formed one crucial flank of Napoleon’s imperialist force. With these experts, France was more than qualified to embark on its *mission civilisatrice* in the Orient, North Africa, and finally, in that Southeast Asian peninsula they called “Indochine,” a cross between India (which they lost to Britain) and China (which no Western power could colonize on its own).

From Napoleon’s Middle East via Indochina to the Far East in the mid-twentieth century we wish to jump. This year being the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Korean War (1950-53), and the center of the capital, the newly concocted “Kwanghwamun Plaza,” regularly occupied by right-wing activists (mostly very old) bent on reminding the citizens how so dreadful, awful, cruel, bloody the killings (mostly by the Communists) had been sixty years ago, it seems appropriate for this rambling essay to stop with another map, as fatal as Emma’s map of Paris in brewing disputes and disasters in the household of the “Korean nation.” When Japan was defeated finally by the Allied Forces (mostly by Americans), the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel slashed into two halves the piece of land the two victors of the World War II, the Americans and the Soviets, sought to control.

Figure 4: The 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel Cuts Korean Peninsula into Two Halves



(source: <http://www.ambrosevideo.com/resources/documents/62.jpg>)

This time the main characters are not the handsome young wife of Doctor Charles Bovary, but two young gentlemen with military looking faces, marked with military intents, and heavily smacking of military pretensions, designated by the Fates (or the U. S. military) to draw the post-War map of Korea. Here is what happened as narrated by J. Lawton Collins:

About midnight, August 10-11, 1945, Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel and Major Dean Rusk . . . began drafting parts of a General Order that would define the zones to be occupied in Korea by American and Russian forces. They were given thirty minutes to complete their draft, which a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was waiting for. The State Department wished the dividing line to be as far north as possible, while the military departments, knowing that the Russians could overrun all of Korea before any American troops could land there, were more cautious. Bonesteel and Rusk wanted to follow provincial boundary lines north of Seoul, which would violate political divisions as little as possible and would place the capital city in the American zone. The only map immediately available was a small-scale wall map of the Far East, and time was pressing. Bonesteel noted that the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel passed north of Seoul and almost divided Korea into two equal parts. He seized on it as the proposed zonal boundary. (Quoted in Cumings 120)

It turns out, then, that the specialist knowledge of the place known as Korea, after all, had been available in Pentagon for some time in the form of that “small-scale wall map of the Far East” with marks of the capital cities of the countries. The 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, a panacea mediating the dispute between the two superpowers and balancing the mutually conflicting desires of the two U.S. government departments, wonderfully epitomizes a rare unity of “scientific” knowledge of the region (that harmonizes “provincial boundary lines” with “political divisions”) and the pressing pragmatic demands of the moment. The bloody Korean War that broke out five years later had done nothing more than to slightly revise the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel created by the two American officers. Will it ever be erased? The wishful thinking (of the Right, these days) that the North would crumbles down stumbles on China’s patronage of the regime. The noble dream (of the Left and the Center) of the “people” embracing each other despite their respective regimes and despite their blood-stained mutual killings should be sobered by how the defectors from the North living in the South (the so-called *saetömin*, literally, “newly-placed people”) are greeted with meager, miserly, grudging hospitality, if at all. “‘Tis sixty years since,” to borrow the subtitle of Walter Scott’s historical novel *Waverley*, yet unlike the tragedy of the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion the novel came to terms with, the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and the Korean War linger on like a protracted terminal cancer. As I revise this essay (25 November), the nation and the world have hardly

recovered from the shock of North Korean shelling of the South Korean island *Yŏnpyŏngdo*. 'Tis sixty years since, but the war drags on, returning like an undead vampire, like a bloodthirsty zombie. What will happen to this unfortunate peninsula? Will the war ever be over? Will there be a real peace, at long last, in this part of the world?

The future is not for us to foretell. The past, however, is what we can and should remember. The very cyber pages of this journal, edited during the past four years by the writer of this essay and published by the oldest university of Korea founded by noble-minded American missionaries, ought to remember how representation of places and determination of identities should strive to be free from the desire to dominate, manipulate, and capitalize. If this journal and its hosting university have a mission to fulfill, it would be to live up to the ideal of Immanuel Kant, the ideal of "world citizenship," so that we can check, instead of assisting, the South Korean fortune hunters eager to repeat the "injustice" of the Western "commercial states" who regarded the lands they exploited "as lands without owners, for they counted the inhabitants as nothing" (Kant 103-04). One hopes that academic studies in this former colony of Japan, this blood-soaked battlefield of an international war, would not repeat the errors of the former Imperialist forces of perceiving the nation, region, city, or any other units of space as real estate to be developed, or a piece of land marked on a map from which people, the living individuals, have been brutally abstracted.

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